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Rough calculations demonstrate that while demographic densities and the techni-
cal capacity for mutual destruction have increased throughout the millennia, the 
violent death rate – the average number of deliberate killings per capita per time 
unit – has been decreasing. The resulting downward trend appears highly non-
linear and mediated by man-made crises and catastrophes, but still, in the long 
term, consecutive. meanwhile, there is no direct evidence of falling aggressiveness 
of the humans in the course of history – natural aggressive impulses were rather 
growing up with population concentration. Obviously, some perfecting cultural 
and psychological mechanisms of aggression-retention have compensated for 
technological and demographic growth. This issue is explored using the pattern of 
techno-humanitarian balance.
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J. Piaget (1997) and his followers (Volovikova, Rebeko, 1990) have 
demonstrated a positive link between individual intellectual and moral 
development. The ethnographers’ observations have empirically veri-
fied the “conflict-enculturation hypothesis”: the downward course of 
violence with increasing age was revealed both in Western and other 
cultures (Munroe, et al., 2000; Chick, 1998). The American psychologist 
L. Kohlberg (1984) tried to apply the notion of moral development to 
human history as a single progressive process, but his optimistic conclu-
sions are still subject of criticism, even by the social evolutionists.
The work was supported by the 07-06-00300 grant from Russian Foundation for Funda-
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In this article, we expound on some cross-disciplinary results car-
ried out lately by the Russian scientists. Insights from archeology, com-
parative history, social psychology, cultural anthropology, ecology and 
biology have been synthesized. A synergetic (i.e. chaos-theory) view of 
society as a sustainable non-equilibrium system and of culture as a com-
plex anti-entropy mechanism served for data integration.
Trying to discover common mechanisms and causal links, certain 
regularities are noted that may throw new light on two points thoroughly 
discussed in historical sociology and psychology. One is whether or not 
“panhuman history” may be reasonably construed; another is whether or 
not there may be observed any kind of evolution in human mentality.
In chaos-theory terms, human history and prehistory is the story of 
one “self-similar” system, which exists on a scale of 2.5 million years and 
has been successively transforming itself to maintain sustainability. Ret-
rospective analytical procedures have shown at least five mainstreams 
of consecutive global transformations: increases of world population, of 
technological power, of organizational complexity, and of mental informa-
tion capacity, and perfection of cultural regulation mechanisms.
The first three mainstreams are inferred as “empirical generaliza-
tions” that are easily illustrated with figures. The fourth and the fifth 
require particular arguments (Nazaretyan, 2004). It is argued that the 
perfection of cultural regulation mechanisms in conformity with devel-
oping instrumental intelligence has been a basic condition for all the 
other mainstreams.
The model of techno-humanitarian balance
Zoologists have gathered substantial evidence concerning ethologi-
cal balance: that is, the more powerful species’ natural killing power, the 
stronger the inhibition of intra-species aggression. Summing up remark-
able observations in his brilliant book about aggression, Lorenz (1981) 
noted that we ought to regret not having the ‘nature of the predator’. For 
had humans descended from lions instead of biologically harmless Aus-
tralopithecus, he explained, we would have a much stronger aggression-
retention instinct preventing warfare.
Meanwhile, comparative calculations have demonstrated that lions 
(and other strong predators), relative to their population, kill each other 
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This result looked sensational. First, it is true that lions, unlike hu-
mans, have a strong instinctive ban on killing conspecifies. Second, li-
ons’ natural population density differs tremendously from that of hu-
man communities, whereas concentration usually increases aggression 
among both animals and humans. Third, ‘killing facilities’ are incom-
parable: the assaulting lion’s sharp teeth meet the enemy’s strong pelt, 
while mutual killing among humans who are armed if only with stones, 
is technically very easy, and since the Stone Age, weapons’ ‘progress’ has 
been enormous.
The Australian ethnographers received another interesting result 
having compared wars among the aboriginals with World War II. Out 
of all participants, only the USSR lost more human lives in relation to 
population numbers than primitive tribes usually did (Blainey, 1975).
According to our calculations, from 100 to 120 million people per-
ished in all the international and civil wars of the 20th century1. The 
numbers, which also involve indirect warfare tolls, are monstrous. Still, 
they represent about 1% of the century’s planet population (no less than 
10.1 billions in the three generations). Approximately a similar ratio oc-
curred in the 19th century (about 35 million war victims to 3 billion 
population), and probably, in the 18th century, while in the 14th to 17th 
centuries the ratio had been higher.
Contradictory data and lack of co-ordinate calculation procedures 
(Wright, 1942; Urlanis, 1994) make comparative inquiry rather difficult. 
Nonetheless, general estimates reveal a paradoxical fact. While weap-
ons’ killing power and people’s concentration have been successively 
growing for millennia, the number of war victims as a percentage of the 
overall population has not.
Besides wars, a total amount of victims includes people perished in 
‘peaceful’ political repressions, and everyday violence, so that in the 20th 
century, up to 4-5% of world population seems to have died in the acts 
of deliberate violence (Nazaretyan, 2008). The decreasing trend is more 
manifest when non-war violence victims are compared. To calculate 
them retrospectively is even more difficult, but as far as the orders of 
magnitude are concerned, we may resort to the indirect evidence.
Wars, repressions, and everyday violence led to approximately simi-
lar numbers of human deaths in the 20th century. Meanwhile, the pro-
1  See also (Mironenko, 2002). The number 187 millions (Hobsbaum, 1994) looks biased.
portion of non-war victims of violence compared to the warfare ones 
was different in the past. We may observe this difference distinctly by 
comparing remote epochs of cultural history.
Thus, J. Diamond (1999, p. 277) summarized his own field obser-
vations and critically revised his colleagues’ information: “Much more 
extensive long-term information about band and tribal societies reveals 
that murder is a leading cause of death”. This conclusion apparently con-
siders the total sum of infanticide, geronticide, inter-tribe, inner con-
flicts, hunting for heads, etc. M. Cohen, a most competent specialist in 
historical demography, who is also known as an admirer of the Paleo-
lithic, still had to recognize: “Even in groups without patterns of formal 
warfare… homicide may be surprisingly common when measured on a 
per capita basis” (Cohen, 1989, p.131).
For a comparative historical research, we used a distinctive cross-
cultural index of practical violence – Bloodshed Ratio (BR), a ratio of the 
average number of killings per unit of time k(Δt) to the population size 
during that period p(Δt):
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For the purpose of global and long-term historical retrospection, 
we accept ∆t = 100 years, as we compare Bloodshed Ratio by centuries. 
The total number of violence victims is considered as the sum of war 
victims – wv, repression victims – rv, and everyday victims – ev. The in-
tegral population number of Earth during the century is the total sum of 
demographic data in the beginning (01st year), the middle (50th year), 
and the end (100th year) of the century.
So, the equation for Bloodshed Ratio of the century looks like:
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Special calculations demonstrate that the violent death rate decreas-
es irregularly in the context of a successively increasing potential for 
mutual destruction and population densities in the course of millen-
nia (Nazaretyan, 2008) (see also (Social’noe nasilie…, 2005; Korotaev, 
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additional assumption: there should have been a certain cultural factor, 
which compensated for the growth of instrumental capacities. The fac-
tor’s dynamics are better shown as we supplement global comparisons 
with regional ones (see below). As to its essence, it is described by a 
hypothesis that arises from quite different empirical data; in fact, our 
calculations are conducted to check a corollary of the hypothesis.
Summing up diverse information from cultural anthropology, histo-
ry, and historical psychology concerning anthropogenic crises, we suggest 
that there was a regular relation between three variables: technological 
potential, cultural regulation quality, and social sustainability. The pattern 
called the law of techno-humanitarian balance, states that the higher the 
power of production and war technologies, the more advanced behavior-
regulation means is required to enable self-preservation of the society.
The circumstances of early hominids’ existence were of the kind that 
only a dramatic development of instrumental intelligence gave them a 
chance to survive (Bromley, 1983). Meantime, having begun tool making, 
they dramatically interfered with the ethological balance. The power of 
artificial weapons rapidly exceeded the power of instinctive aggression-
inhibition, and the proportion of mortal conflicts within the population 
grew incompatible with its further existence. This could have been the 
main reason for the fact demonstrated in archeology (Klix, 1985): many 
groups seem to be on the margine between animals and proto-humans, 
but very few could cross it; those few groups managed to cope with the 
endogenous danger.
Indeed, individuals with normal animal motivation were doomed 
to mutual destruction in the new unnatural conditions, and the groups 
in which certain psychostenic and hysterical individuals prevailed, got 
selective privileges. Their survival required artificial (beyond biologi-
cal instincts) collective regulation, which was paradoxically provided by 
pathological changes of the psycho-nervous system, abnormal mental 
lability, suggestibility, and phobias. Thus, irrational fear of the dead and 
posthumous revenge is supposed to strongly restrain in-group aggres-
sion. It also stimulated care for cripples: archeology gives us evidence of 
such biologically senseless facts in the early Paleolithic.
The assumption of a “herd of crazies” who seem to be our remote 
ancestors has been thoroughly argued by the neurologists, cultural an-
thropologists and psychologists (Davydenkov, 1947; Pfeiffer, 1982; Gri-
mak, 2001; Nazaretyan, 2005). Here, the relevant point is that the initial 
forms of proto-culture and proto-morals emerged as an outcome of the 
first existential crisis in human prehistory: neurosis compensated for the 
insufficient instinct as aggression-inhibitor and served ferment for the 
development of spiritual reality.
From Homo habilis on, hominids’ unnatural intra-species killing fa-
cility seems to have been a key problem of pre-human and human his-
tory: the ways of solving this existential problem influenced essentially 
the forms of social organization, cultural, and spiritual processes. As far 
as the further life of the hominidae family (including Homo sapiens) has 
not had a natural background any longer, it was to a great extent enabled 
by the adequacy of cultural regulation with technological power. The 
law of techno-humanitarian balance has controlled socio-historical se-
lection, discarding social organisms that could not adapt to their tools’ 
power. We shall demonstrate that the pattern helps explain causally both 
sudden collapses of flourishing societies and breakthroughs of human-
ity into new historical epochs (which often look still more mysterious).
Although the pattern is based on voluminous empirical evidence, its 
universal character remains hypothetical. Besides comparative calcula-
tions of the victims of violence, there are some additional non-trivial 
corollaries under verification. Furthermore, a special apparatus is be-
ing constructed, which will allow estimating sustainability of social or-
ganisms as much as it depends on technological potential and cultural 
regulation.
For an initial and rough guide, internal and external sustainability 
are distinguished. The former, Si, expresses capability of the social sys-
tem to keep away from endogenous catastrophes, and is estimated as the 
ratio of catastrophes per population number. The latter, Se, is capability 
to withstand natural and/or geopolitical habitat’s fluctuations.
If we refer to the quality of cultural regulation as R, and technologi-
cal potential as T, a simple equation represents the techno-humanitari-
an balance pattern:
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It goes without saying that T > 0, for in case of no technology at all we 
are dealing with a herd (not a society) where biological causalities are 
effective. When technological potential is very low, primitive cultural 
regulation means is sufficient to prevent anthropogenic crises, as in the 78 Akop P. Nazaretyan On the mechanisms of moral development in evolutionary historical Psychology 79
case of the Paleolithic tribes. A system is highly sustainable, up to stag-
nation, as cultural regulation quality considerably exceeds technological 
might (Confucian China is a textbook example). Finally, the denomina-
tor growth increases the probability of anthropogenic crises, if it is not 
compensated by growth of the numerator.
Actually, the indices’ structure, the methods of quantitative estima-
tion and the definition of functions f1 and f2 are under consideration. 
Thus, the magnitude of R is composed of at least three parameters: the so-
cial organization’s complexity, the culture’s information complexity (an-
thropologists work over calculation procedures for these indices (Chick, 
1997)), and the average individual’s cognitive complexity (the parameter 
is investigated by experimental psycho-semantics (Petrenko, 2005)). The 
last component is the most dynamic one, and we will show that the de-
cline of cognitive complexity under emotional impulse is the leading rea-
son of crisis-causing behavior. In contrast to internal sustainability, the 
external one is the technological potential’s positive function2.
  Se = g (T...)  (IV)
Thus, growing technological potential makes a social system less vul-
nerable to external fluctuations, and more vulnerable to the internal ones, 
i.e. mass mental states, inadequate decisions of influential leaders, etc. 
(less “fool-proof”).
One more conclusion is that the specific weight of anthropogenic 
crises versus the ones caused by outside factors (spontaneous climate 
fluctuations, geological and cosmic cataclysms, incoming aggressive no-
mads, and so on) has been historically increasing.
The consequences  
of techno-humanitarian imbalance
Ethnographic papers are full of tragic stories about the aboriginals 
of Africa, Asia, and America, as soon as they first mastered European 
technologies, like the following. During the Vietnam War, a Paleolithic 
Mountain Khmer tribe obtained American carbines. The hunters mas-
2   For example, the tables, which reflect the effects of natural hazards in various regions, 
demonstrate that the economic damage in technologically advanced countries is usu-
ally more considerable while human victims are less numerous than in technologically 
backward ones.
tered the new weapon, and soon after that, exterminated the fauna, shot 
each other down, and those who survived, left the mountains and disap-
peared (Pegov & Puzachenko, 1994).
Such cases look kike “artifacts”, as far as the technologies had come 
from outside, the society had skipped over several historical phases, and 
left a deep gap between firearm and Stone Age psychology; therefore, 
the processes were accelerated, and causes and effects were apparent. 
Similar leaps do not usually occur in the authentic history, and thus, 
the  disparity  between  ‘instrumental’  and  ‘humanitarian’  intelligence 
(the ‘force’ and the ‘wisdom’) is not that manifest. So, causal links are 
complex, delayed for centuries or, in early history, for millennia. To be 
revealed, the same causalities require a thorough analysis supplied with 
an appropriate working model.
To explain the model, we may first resort to a classic experiment 
in a Petrie dish. Several bacteria impetuously propagate themselves in 
the closed vessel with a nutrient medium, and soon, the population suf-
focates in its own wastes. This is a graphic image of living matter’s be-
havior: as long as the capacity of extensive growth prevails over habitat’s 
resistance, the population keeps on capturing available vital space, and 
repressing as much as it can any counteraction or competition. For this 
reason, a natural ecosystem is full of ecological micro-crises.
In natural conditions, the aggravations are usually regulated via dy-
namic equilibration mechanisms, which have been developed for billions 
of years. Strategically, the processes of breaking and restoring an inner 
balance lead to increasing variety of ecosystems and their joint sustain-
ability, which go together with the highly irregular conditions of each 
population’s existence (oscillations in ‘predator – prey’ circuit, etc.).
Culture, in both its material and regulative hypostases, has always 
been aimed at emancipation from spontaneous environmental fluctua-
tions. Social communities, unlike animal populations, do not behave so 
rectilinearly as the bacteria colony in a Petrie dish does, until cultural 
restraints  substitute  for  the  environment’s  resistance3.  Meanwhile,  a 
3   Those regulators may sometimes horrify an observer who belongs to another culture, 
but they enable the society’s existence in the ecological niche. Many ethnographers re-
ported that a typical method of demographic stability for primitive tribes was normative 
infanticide, regular extermination of the “unwanted” babies, especially female, and cas-
tration. In some tribes, a man may not marry without having killed or castrated another 
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broken balance between grown technological opportunities and former 
regulation mechanisms can change the situation radically. According 
to formula (III), it decreases internal social sustainability, but the ap-
proaching menace is not noticed right away.
On the contrary, superiority of instrumental intelligence entails the 
rise of ecological and/or geopolitical aggression. Insufficiency of cul-
tural restraints makes the society’s behavior essentially similar to that 
of a biological population, especially as natural expansion impulses are 
supplemented with a specifically human factor: needs go higher as soon 
as they are satisfied.
The psychological aspect is given more detailed analysis in the fol-
lowing section. We must just note here that sooner or later, extensive 
growth runs against real limits, which leads to anthropogenic crisis. 
Most frequently, it is followed by the catastrophic phase: the society falls 
a victim to its own non-compensated power.
Special investigations show that most tribes, states, or civilizations 
in the past were destroyed not so much by external factors (such cases 
also took place, but they are less interesting for our subject), but because 
they had subverted the natural and organizational bases of their own ex-
istence. As to military interventions, epidemics, ecological cataclysms, 
riots, and so on, events of that kind usually accomplished the society’s 
self-destroying activity, like a virus or cancer cells do a similar job in a 
weakened biological organism.
Numerous facts gathered in relevant papers (Grigoriev, 1991; Glob-
al, 2002) testify to the distressing destiny of societies that could not an-
ticipate the delayed consequences of their economic activities. In spite 
of all peculiarities, a common script was simple: increasing intervention 
into the ecosystem → landscape destruction → social catastrophe.
As many researchers have indicated, an empire’s destruction fre-
quently followed its flourishing, if increasing inner diversity did not ac-
company extensive growth. A. Toynbee cited various examples to illus-
trate the inverse relationship between “military and social progress” and 
was puzzled by the fact that this was surprisingly true about production 
tools as well as weapons. Modern historians have also repeatedly indi-
cated that new technical achievements usually preceded social decline: 
“It certainly seems as though… every heightening of efficiency in pro-
duction were matched by a new vulnerability to breakdown” (McNeill, 
1992, p.148).
The facts of social systems’ fracture conditioned by technological 
growth are so numerous that they serve as a pretext, on the one hand, 
for total technological pessimism and, on the other, for denial of a com-
mon human history. The patterns of closed civilization cycles deprived 
of continuity started to supplant the ones of single historical process 
in the late 19th, early 20th centuries. The discussion of those problems 
has resurfaced lately in relevant literature. To a considerable extent, it 
centers on the psychological aspect: if human consciousness has been 
transforming historically, whether or not those transformations were 
‘progressive’?
Nowadays, the idea gets new empirical and conceptual support. 
The techno-humanitarian balance hypothesis highlights both the facts 
of a social system’s self-destruction and the opposite ones, concerning 
the constructive solution to anthropogenic crises. The latter have been 
less frequent in the past; however, they were the turning points of world 
history.
Namely, as a certain crisis involved a vast region highly saturated 
with diverse cultures, its inhabitants managed to find a key way out 
of the deadlock. Each time it was conditioned by a set of irreversible 
social, political, and psychological transformations (see below), which 
have been lined up as the consecutive evolution mainstreams. As spe-
cial analysis shows, society’s capacity for the appropriate transformation 
of its economy, policy and mentality essentially depended on marginal 
groups, which had been formerly neglected and despised; this we refer 
to as the redundant variety rule.
No less than seven crucial breakthroughs for all of human history 
and prehistory have been revealed and described. Still, most researchers 
have so far either confined themselves to phenomenology or left for the 
future the problem of causes and premises of the revolutionary trans-
formation. Thus, Jaspers (1955) has adduced “the simultaneity puzzle”: 
how could the Axial Revolt occur simultaneously on the immense geo-
graphical area from Judea, Persia and Greece to India and China?
The  techno-humanitarian  balance  hypothesis  proves  helpful  for 
causal scrutiny of great historical turning points, each of which had 
been preceded by a wide-scale anthropogenic crisis. Human conscious-
ness has progressively evolved, restoring step-by-step the disturbed 
cultural balance. So more curious is the fact we find out as we make a 
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extensive growth phases are attended by psychological states, process-
es, and mechanisms, which have astonishingly reproduced themselves 
regardless of the population’s cultural and historical peculiarities. That 
is why a coming crisis may be diagnosed by psychological symptoms 
while economic, political, and other signs still indicate growing social 
prosperity.
Mental conditions  
on the threshold of a crisis
To begin this section, we consider selected historical episodes that 
belong to a kind of ‘optimistic tragedies’. This will help us observe some 
specific psychological features of both the pre-crisis state of culture and 
minds and the one that is present after having coped with the most dan-
gerous aggravations. Here, only the inner logic of the processes is con-
sidered; this approach abstracts from the influence of outside factors, up 
to cosmic ones, on social events.
Apparently, in order to describe those episodes as single separate 
stories we have to single them out of the continual historical process; for 
this reason, the conventional beginning and end of each are distinct by 
means of dots.
…The Upper Paleolithic millennia were marked with an unprec-
edented development of “hunting automation” and distant projectiles. 
Hunters learned to dig trap-holes, and invented the lance, lance-throw-
er, darts, and bow with arrows (Bromley, 1983; Semionov, 1964). This 
created good conditions for demographic growth and human expan-
sion all over the planet. World population reached 5 – 7 million people 
(McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Snooks, 1996). As one hunter-gatherer’s nour-
ishment required an average territory of 10 – 20 square km., the planet’s 
resources could not provide for many more people.
However, not only demographic growth created the problem (growth 
by itself is usually a function of a disturbed technology-psychology bal-
ance): archeologists reveal the Upper Paleolithic hunting bacchanalia. 
While natural predators first get sick and weakened individuals, a well-
armed hunter had the opportunity (and desire) to kill the strongest and 
the nicest ones, and besides, the amount of preys far exceeded the hunt-
ers’ biological needs. Some kind of wild animals’ “anthropogenic grave-
yards” were discovered by the archeologists, and a great part of the meat 
had not been used by humans. The dwellings made of mammoth’s bones 
exceeded construction needs. In Siberia, 30-40 adult mammoths’ bones 
were spent on each dwelling, plus newly-born mammoths’ skulls, which 
were used as props and, perhaps, for ritual aims. In the basins of Don 
and Dnepr, pit-stores of mammoths’ bones (their predestination is not 
quite clear) have been found near some dwellings. Enclosure hunting 
led to annual extermination of herds (Budyko, 1984; Burovsky, 1998; 
Anikovich, 1999).
Since  the  fact  was  discovered  that  the  last  mammoths  lived  on 
Wrangell Island about 4000 years ago, until the first humans appeared 
there (Vartanian, et al., 1995), the “overkill” theory of mammoths’ and 
many other big mammals’ extinction hardly has an alternative. The first 
symptoms of mega-fauna elimination are registered near 50000 years 
ago in Africa, and the process peaked near 20000 years ago in Eurasia, 
and near 11000 years ago in America (Karlen, 2001). Skillful hunters 
penetrated into America, quickly spread from Alaska to Tierra del Fu-
ego, and eradicated all big animals, including elephants and camels, 
which had never before met hominids. Similar effects of mega-fauna ex-
tinction followed the first humans’ appearance in Oceania and Australia 
(Budyko, 1984; Diamond, 1999). In total, up to 90% big animals disap-
peared for ever, although those species had endured twenty Pleistocene 
climatic cycles.
The trend of merciless extermination was intensified on the thresh-
old of the coming Holocene, the post-glacial epoch, which could have 
helped foraging economies flourish; instead, it led to a deadlock. Nature 
could not bear endless pressure on the part of such an unrestrained ag-
gressor as the Upper Paleolithic hunter. Uncontrolled resource exploita-
tion led to the ecosystems’ exhaustion and destruction, and it aggravated 
inter-tribe competition. Population on the Middle latitudes decreased 
several times.
The Neolithic revolution was society’s creative response to the Upper 
Paleolithic crisis: some tribes made the transition to settled agriculture 
and cattle breeding, and the new economic idea rapidly spread from 
several centers (in Eurasia, and later in America). Humans first started 
“partnership with the nature” (Childe, 1936); their ecological niche es-
sentially deepened. Thanks to developing agriculture, the territories’ 
carrying capacity increased one, and then two, and then three orders of 
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Complex transformations in social relations and psychology attend-
ed the transition from foraging economy to food production. One needs 
a relevant mental horizon of delayed causalities to throw into earth eat-
able grains, or to feed and protect animals instead of kill and eat them. 
The mind’s grown information volume was embodied in all vital activi-
ties. Social links and role repertory essentially broadened. Production 
and combat tools were first differentiated, and a new kind of relationship 
between agricultural and “warrior” tribes was established. The warriors 
could guess that it was more profitable to protect the producers, and 
regularly appropriate production “surplus”, than to kill or to drive them 
away, and the farmers understood it was better to payoff the warriors for 
protection than to leave the land or to perish in hopeless battles.
Such  forms  of  inter-tribe  symbiosis  and  “collective  exploitation” 
supplanted genocide and cannibalism of the Paleolithic. As Telhard de 
Chardin (1987) notes, since the Neolithic, physical extermination has 
been an exclusive or, anyhow, secondary factor: the cruelest warfare still 
included some form of assimilation. Modern anthropologists have also 
indicated more than once that only in the Neolithic tribe integration 
(the chiefdoms), people learned “for the first time in history, how to en-
counter strangers regularly without attempting to kill them” (Diamond, 
1999, p.273).
Population geneticists have recently added a bright trait to the Neo-
lithic portrayal (Sykes, 2001). Unlike previously prevalent scenario, they 
showed, the substitution of foraging economy by agriculture had not 
occurred via swimming aside or eliminating the hunters-gatherers by 
an incoming tide of farmers (for instance, from the South Caucasus to 
the East and to the North-West) but via displacement of the retrograde 
technologies and organization. At least, so it was in Europe: most of 
modern Europeans proved to be genetic offspring of the Cro-Magnon 
hunters. To all appearance, the European story was not an exception.
This is a sensational discovery. It means that first in human history a 
progressive idea won through change of mental matrix, instead of physi-
cal removal of the old idea bearers, what had been usual for the Paleo-
lithic. So, the competition of social models was not merely a struggle of 
races any more: it shifted partly to the “virtual” sphere, which imparted 
a new long-term mechanism to the historical development…
…In  the  12-11th  centuries  BC  iron  production  appeared  in  the 
Middle East, Transcaucasia, and East Mediterranean and soon spread 
to India and China. This produced a steep rise in extensive (including 
demographic) growth opportunities.
Bronze weapons had been expensive, fragile, and heavy. Small profes-
sional armies composed of physically very strong men had waged wars. 
It had been extremely expensive to prepare and to arm such troops, as 
well as to replace a killed fighter. Therefore, each commander had tried 
to spare his own warriors, and exterminate as many enemies as possible. 
War-captives had been usually killed, and a subjugated population had 
been terrorized into obedience, by demonstratively destroying or “taking 
prisoners” the local gods’ statues, etc. (Berzin, 1984; Neronova, 1989).
Steel weapons were considerably cheaper, more durable, and lighter 
than the ones of bronze. This allowed arming the whole male popula-
tion; something like a ‘people’s volunteer corps’ replaced the profession-
al armies, and competition for productive soils aggravated. Meantime, 
the combination of new technology with former social, political, and 
military values made early Iron Age leaders extraordinarily bloodthirsty 
(Berzin, 1984; Vigasin, 1994).
Emperors and generals hewed on stones boastful ‘accounts’ to their 
gods about the numbers of enemies killed, and towns destroyed and burned, 
which presented sadistic details of their “deeds” (a relevant texts collection 
from ‘Reader on Ancient East History’ see in (Nazaretyan, 2008)). Battles 
became so bloody and diminution of male population so fast that further 
life of technologically advanced states was threatened.
Culture responded to the challenge with the Axial Spiritual Revolu-
tion, the causes of which, as indicated before, has remained a puzzle 
so far. On vast geographical area, great prophets, philosophers, states-
men and generals set the tone for society’s intensive job on the whole 
value system’s revision. Cultures transformed unrecognizably in sev-
eral centuries. The cognitive complexity of social and individual minds, 
humans’ capacity for abstract thinking and reflection, and the scale of 
generic identity radically increased. Universal ideas of good and evil, 
personal choice and responsibility appeared. Authoritarian mythologi-
cal thinking first in history partly made room for criticism, and the new 
private self-control instance, the conscience, made an alternative to tra-
ditional gods-fear. Enemies learned to see each other as human beings, 
understand, and sympathize. Aeschylus’s tragedy ‘The Persians’ was the 
first work of art in history that described warfare as seen by the enemies’ 
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These mental processes were distinctly reflected in political rela-
tions. Objective aim achievement, instead of the number of victims, 
became a matter of virtue and the combat success criterion. The role of 
military reconnaissance and propaganda among enemy troops and pop-
ulation grew. A new tradition of the conqueror’s protection over local 
gods and priests appeared. ‘Political demagogy’ as a means of persua-
sion and pacification contrasted with the usual terror methods: in 539 
BC, the Persian king Cyrus the Great having captured Babel, proclaimed 
a Manifesto, which said that his army was just going to defend Babylo-
nians and their gods and priests from their own bad king Nabonid. This 
genial trick soon spread far outside Middle East, to South Europe, India 
and China...
...All symptoms of the evolution’s next deadlock were manifest in 
II Millennium AD Europe. Development of agricultural technologies 
stimulated demographic growth; besides, the Christian Church, which 
had primarily called to refuse marriages and child-bearing, in the 9th 
century changed its attitude by the opposite one (Arutiunian, 2000). 
The woods area was decreasing, swamps were being formed, and their 
water steamed down to rivers, together with all the wastes of growing 
cities.
The ecological crisis provoked social tension, disorders, and epidem-
ics. Wars were becoming more and more murderous. Even the disaster of 
Black Death in the 14th century that took away more than 1/3 of Europe 
population, only temporarily interrupted the demographic tendency 
(Le Goff, 1977). Development of agricultural and military technologies 
had produced a new strategic evolutionary deadlock, as hunting tech-
nologies had done long before. In the 17th century, the Thirty-Year War 
with developed artillery and other firearms took lives of about 80-90% 
adult male population in Central Europe.
The crisis of agricultural civilization was partly softened by mass 
emigration, and besides, introduction of the overseas plants (potato, 
maize), and carbon utilization (Le Goff, 1977; Bondarev, 1996). The 
‘Pre-Industrial Dash’ that turned Europe from a Eurasian outsider to the 
world leader, was forestalled and attended by impetuous development 
of the ideas of humanism, individualism, enlightenment, and progress. 
The values of individual success, qualification and education increased 
unprecedented. According to the calculations of the Russian economic 
historian V. Mel’yancev (1996, 2004), on the turn of II Millennium, West 
European countries fell behind the leading Asian states in literacy of 
adult population twice and more, while on the threshold of the Indus-
trial Revolt, exceeded them 3 – 3.5 times.
The Thirty-Year War completed with The Westfall Peace Treaty, and 
relevant political organization saved Europe from most sanguinary re-
ligious (or quasi-religious) wars for the next 2.5 centuries. A new legal, 
economic and moral mentality was being formed, which implied equal 
natural rights, free market interchange and panhuman ethics in place of 
the foregoing estate domination and clan mentality. The humanitarian 
achievements enabled the new historical breakthrough, and it left be-
hind the agricultural crisis (which may be therefore qualified as regional 
by geographic extension and global by the evolutionary consequences). 
It also implied the superiority of the active Spirit over the passive Matter 
and the Future over the Past4
European nations spread with fire and sword the light of reason, and 
their power soon enveloped the whole planet, resources of which fell 
under parent states’ control. European citizens’ faith in moral progress 
and future everlasting peace was based on the indisputable superiority 
of the Western mind, and was growing together with social and eco-
nomic prosperity, needs, and ambitions. Wile the soldiers fought in ex-
otic lands, mother countries’ inhabitants believed wars and their cruelty 
were a thing of the past. No wonder: in all the colonial wars of the 19th 
century, Europeans’ losses were 106000 soldiers, in contrast with mil-
lions of natives who perished in the same warfare (Urlanis, 1994).
In the early 20th century, reserves of extensive growth were exhaust-
ed, while it was yet far from sobering the public. By the following events, 
by various official and memory documents, and by indirect testimonies, 
we can see that the inertia of extensive development and corresponding 
state of minds still dominated. Thirst for new successes and achieve-
ments produced joyful expectancies of either a “small victorious war” or 
a “revolutionary tempest” among politicians, intellectuals, and masses. 
The photos of August 1914, which show us happy crowds in Petrograd, 
4   Some Sinologists (Lin Yufu, 1995) have shown that all technological and economic 
premises were in place for an industrial revolution in the 14th century China. However, 
world model and value system did not favor this radical transformation, unlike the situa-
tion of the Europeans in the 18-19th centuries who had met the deep crisis and developed 
a new progress-oriented worldview, which was a psychological compensation of the Late 
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Berlin, Vienna, and Paris streets after the war had been declared, are a 
brightest illustration (Pirozhkova, 1997).
Now, we may observe a result of those social and psychological pro-
cesses. Whereas European countries’ summary warfare losses during 
the 19th century were about 5.5 million people (about 15% of all war 
victims in the world), in the 20th century they rose to 70 million – no 
less than 60%. Two World Wars, Hiroshima, and many years of nuclear 
“equilibrium of fear” were required for Europeans’ psychological altera-
tion. Was it for long time?..
Having compared crisis episodes of the past and the present, we may 
sum up certain psychological observations. Once new instrumental fa-
cilities exceed former cultural restrictions, and an extensive develop-
ment begins, public attitudes and sentiments acquire peculiar features. 
A sense of omnipotence and permissiveness is intensified together with 
increasing needs and ambitions. Optimistic ideas of a world full of in-
exhaustible resources and the object of subjugation are formed. Success 
euphoria produces an impatient expectation of new successes and a 
drive to “small victorious wars” (a mass complex of catostrophophilia, 
in terms of the political philosopher P. Sloterdeyk). The subjugation pro-
cess and the search for new moderately resisting enemies are becoming 
self-valuable and irrational.
The proximity of desired aims intensifies motivational tension: the 
“aim-gradient phenomenon” in Gestalt psychology. According to an-
other pattern, the Yerkes – Dodson law, the efficiency of a simple activ-
ity is proportional to the motivational force, while the efficiency of a 
complex activity decreases by excessive motivation. This is one of the 
sources of danger.
As psycho-semantic experiments have shown, emotional tension 
decreases cognitive complexity (Petrenko, 1982). So, the world picture 
becomes lower-dimensional, thinking turns more primitive, and the 
problem situations look elementary, while objectively, the task of the 
social system’s maintenance becomes more difficult as technological op-
portunities grow. In other words, the numerator index in equation (III), 
instead of increasing in proportion to the denominator’s growth, is fall-
ing. Therefore, cultural imbalance lowers the society’s internal sustain-
ability.
Exploring the premises of revolutionary crises, J. Davis (1969) has 
shown that revolutions are usually preceded by an increase in the quality 
of living standards in terms of economic level, political freedoms, social 
mobility, etc. Simultaneously, needs and expectations grow as well. In a 
certain moment, increasing expectancies run against relatively reduced 
possibilities for their satisfaction. This occurs frequently because of de-
mographic growth and/or unsuccessful warfare, which was expected to 
be “small and victorious”, whereas the expectancies go on increasing via 
their own momentum. The gap between increasing expectations and ac-
tualities produces frustrations, the situation looks unbearable and hu-
miliating, people tend to seek those guilty, and aggression that cannot 
find release externally, gives vent inside the social system. Emotional 
resonance (Nazaretyan, 2003) provokes mass disorders, which in many 
cases become the last act in pre-crisis development tragicomedy.
Having applied Davis’s model to various countries and historical sit-
uations, we have found that it is applicable both to large communities, 
such as states or civilizations, and relatively small ones, such as political 
parties. Nowadays, the model may be used, with certain reservations, in 
global situation analysis as well.
Since some countries and regions, and planetary civilization as a 
whole are experiencing typical anthropogenic crises, which are fraught 
with great dangers in the 21st century, the question of the mechanisms of 
such crises’ aggravation and overcoming them is not a purely academic 
one. Certain facts show that during the second half of the 20th century 
great changes for the better took place. Politicians abstained from using 
the most destructive weapons; new kinds of inter-state coalitions were 
formed, which were not aimed against any outer force (an original fact 
in human history!), and effective international ecological measures be-
came usual.
Fifty years ago, many people were not sure the 20th century would 
successfully change into the 21st, and this doubt had grounds. The most 
obvious one was a highly probable world nuclear war, still, not only this 
was the case. Modern ecologists demonstrate that had economic activi-
ties of humankind (including atomic weapon tests) remained so ‘ecolog-
ically dirty’ as it was in the 1950-s, life on Earth in the 1990-s would have 
become unbearable: both human population and longevities would be 
falling down, etc. (Yefremov, 2004).
Those encouraging facts gave rise to the hope that Western-type 
cultures had already developed a strong rational control reserve over 
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Unfortunately, what followed one side’s unconditional victory in the 
Cold War demonstrated that maturity of political thought even in the 
most advanced modern cultures does not yet meet the requirements 
imposed by actual technological potential. Current Homo prae-crisimos 
psychological  symptoms  are  described  in  (Nazaretyan,  2004;  2008): 
lowered political intelligence, decision-making quality and propaganda 
rhetoric level in the 1990-s compared to the preceding decades.
We may observe how simplified worldview and rectilinear exten-
sive activities are provoking hostility. Meanwhile, emerging forms of 
sophisticated weapons and new methods of political terrorism make 
impossible  the  continuation  of  the  previous  half-century  practices, 
which was canalization of the global conflict in local wars. According 
to the hypothesis of techno-humanitarian balance, actual challenges, 
including political terrorism with its growing technical opportunities, 
will either destroy the planet’s civilization, or play an educating role, 
comparable to the ones of the atom bomb and other dramatic technical 
inventions in the past.
An outline of global anthropogenic  
crises and revolutionary breaks
In conclusion, we briefly enumerate human history’s turning points: 
that  is,  historical  periods  when  anthropogenic  crises,  which  may  be 
qualified as global ones by their evolutionary meaning, were solved via a 
breakthrough into the new epoch (see in detail (Nazaretyan, 2008)). As 
some of them have been mentioned above, we cannot escape repeating 
certain details to give an overall portrayal of consecutive transformations 
in macro-social behavior as it is seen from the current perspective.
All appellations of the revolutions in the following list go with quote 
marks, for some of the terms have not been widely accepted, though all 
are present in relevant literature.
1. The ‘Paleolithic Revolution’ (2.5-1.2 million years ago) was con-
nected with the emergence of the first artificial tools (choppers), and 
hence, disturbance of the ethological balance, which is peculiar to ani-
mal populations: the existential crisis of anthropogenesis. Mystical fear 
of the dead (after-life revenge) was responsible for primary super-in-
stinctive proto-cultural regulation: intra-group aggression was first arti-
ficially limited, and an unnatural care for the cripples appeared.
2. The ‘Upper Paleolithic Revolution’, or the ‘’Cro-Magnons’ Cul-
tural  Revolution”  (35-40  thousand  years  ago):  transition  from  the 
Middle to the Upper Paleolithic and conclusive extermination of the 
Neanderthals. Stone material productivity grew, and the portion of 
tools made of bone and horn increased as well, which gave people 
relative independence from natural sources of flint. Sign communi-
cation systems, including articulate speech, were obviously perfected, 
and  two-dimensional  portrayal  (the  rock  pictures)  appeared.  Why 
could not Paleoanthropes, who had developed complex Mustier cul-
ture and dominated their contemporaneous Neoanthropes (Proto-Cro-
Magnons) during no less than 150000 years, resist more? We have to 
assume that Mustier culture was experiencing a deep crisis, though its 
essence is not quite clear.
There are two hypotheses to explain this; both well conform to the 
techno-humanitarian balance pattern. One accents the facts of culture’s 
high material variability and very scanty signs of ‘spiritual produc-
tion’. Free choice of physical actions with insufficient spiritual regula-
tion produced the Neanderthal’s neurotic syndrome that was expressed 
in antisocial activity and splashes of uncontrolled aggressive energy 
(Lobok, 1997). Another hypothesis (Reymers, 1990) attaches the Late 
Mustier crisis to ecological effects: the Neanderthals had hit upon the 
idea to burn vegetation off, which caused landscapes’ higher productiv-
ity, but this led to a fatal decrease of biological diversity.
3. The ‘Neolithic Revolution’ (X-VIII millennia BC): transition from 
a highly expensive foraging economy to food production, which went 
along with replacing the usual genocide and cannibalism with rudi-
mentary collective exploitation forms, and was also accompanied by the 
original symbiosis of agricultural and ‘warrior’ tribes.
Those deep complex transformations were a response to the Upper 
Paleolithic crisis, which had been aggravated because of hunter tech-
nologies’ development. This had led to the elimination of wild animals’ 
populations and species, and to severe inter-tribe competition. During 
the Upper Paleolithic crisis, previous demographic growth had been 
replaced by a population decrease, and just after agricultural methods 
dominated, the population grew again.
4. The ‘Urban Revolution’ (V-III millennia BC): large human ag-
glomerations were formed, irrigation channels were constructed, and 
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lated large communities’ lives, with a high human concentration and 
complex common activities.
This revolution followed spread of bronze tools, new demographic 
explosion, and the aggravation of competition for grasslands and fertile 
soil in some regions (see the theory of environmental circumscription 
in (Carneiro, 1970)).
5. The ‘Axial Revolution’ (the middle of the I millennium BC): new 
kinds of thinkers, politicians, and generals, such as Zarathustra, the Ju-
daic prophets, Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Cyrus the Great, Asoka, 
Sun-Tzu, and others, appeared during a short time interval in advanced 
societies, which were yet weakly linked among themselves, and deeply 
transformed the world culture. Criticism first supplanted authoritarian 
mythological thinking; universal ideas of good and evil, and of person-
ality as a sovereign moral choice subject were formed. Aims and meth-
ods of warfare changed: victims’ numbers ceased to serve as a combat 
masterpiece measure and a pretext for boasting; the value of communi-
cation considerably increased, and primitive violence and terror were 
partly replaced by intelligence data and ‘political demagogy’.
The Axial Epoch followed displacement of bronze with iron weap-
ons, which were cheaper, lighter and more durable, and instead of pro-
fessional armies, some kind of people’s militia had appeared. As a result, 
battles became extraordinarily bloody, and former values and norms in 
new conditions could have destroyed advanced societies. Therefore, the 
Axial Revolution was culture’s response to a dangerous gap between new 
weapons’ power and former aggression-retention mechanisms.
(The American cultures that developed separately passed through 
the same stages, though later in time. There are signs that the European 
conquerors found advanced societies of both Americas in a deep crisis 
caused by overpopulation, and on the threshold of a spiritual revolution, 
which could have been similar to the Old World’s Axial Epoch (Semi-
onov, 2009). Meanwhile, the aboriginals of the other isolated continent, 
Australia, conserved their Paleolithic life, culture, and psychology with-
out having reached the Upper-Paleolithic crisis, the Neolithic Revolu-
tion, etc.).
6. The ‘Industrial Revolution’ (AD 18-19th centuries): introduction 
of relatively “spare” technologies, which had higher specific productiv-
ity than agricultural ones. It was prepared and attended by a complex 
spiritual framework, the ‘indust-reality’, in Al. Toffler’s term.
The industrial revolution was preceded by a long crisis of agricul-
tural civilization in Europe (12-18th centuries), when uncontrolled ex-
tensive growth, cutting down of forests, destruction of ecosystems and 
people’s concentration in the cities had led to outbreaks of bloody war-
fare and mass mortal epidemics. The development of agricultural tech-
nologies had produced a new strategic evolutionary deadlock, as well as, 
long before, hunting technologies had done.
In its turn, the industrial production having increased power of hu-
man effort, gave a new impulse to extensive development, demographic 
growth, and ecological and geopolitical ambitions. So, like it had been 
mostly before, the solution of one crisis opened the way towards the fol-
lowing ones.
7. The ‘Information Revolution’? In the middle of the 20th century, 
many people felt that planetary civilization was approaching a new cri-
sis epoch. Its circumstances may also be well described in terms of the 
techno-humanitarian balance pattern. In the previous 100 years, weap-
ons’ power had grown 6 orders of magnitude. Human intelligence had 
achieved such high instrumental might that the aggression-retention 
means, which reflected previous historical experience, could not meet 
the new requirements any more. The instrumental intelligence became 
dangerous for its own bearer’s further existence again…
Discussion
Historically constraining physical violence does not mean that the 
humans have been turning “less aggressive” in the course of time; on 
the contrary, concentration as a bio-psychological factor had to stimu-
late natural aggressiveness, and developing technologies gave new op-
portunities for multiple killings. Still, developing social system, pass-
ing through the crucible of crises and catastrophes due to repeatedly 
renewing  power/wisdom  disparities,  was  impelled  to  progressively 
diversify, improve and select creative mechanisms of aggression-subli-
mation. Cultures have been developing more sophisticated languages 
of communication and replacing creative activities, and individuals 
had to perfect their motivation and self-control to sustain collective 
viability.
The hypothesis of techno-humanitarian balance gives an additional 
dimension to L. White’s conception, which was one of the most influ-94 Akop P. Nazaretyan On the mechanisms of moral development in evolutionary historical Psychology 95
ential models of social evolution in the 20th century. In the words of his 
Canadian adherent V. Smil (1994, p.1): “From the perspective of natu-
ral science, both prehistoric human evolution and the course of history 
may be seen as the quest for controlling greater energy stores and flows”. 
Now as we find out that excessive power is self-destructive for a social 
system unless it is internally balanced with proportional cultural and 
psychological counterbalance, the model of development reduced to en-
ergy alone looks substantially insufficient even from the perspective of 
natural science.
Turning back to the historical experience of man-made crises, in-
cluding the ‘optimistic tragedies’, we may note that each new technol-
ogy, both military and production, usually carried menace of growing 
destruction of geopolitical and/or natural habitat and after a period of 
euphoria, caused social catastrophes. This launched the process of dra-
matic selection of social and value systems, which could respond the 
challenge. As soon as the phase of cultural and psychological fitting was 
completed (not before that moment!), even war technologies became 
life-protecting factor: calculations in (Nazaretyan, 2008) show that after 
fitting, the more potentially destructive a weapon is the less murderous 
effect it really causes.
In case of constructive solution of such crises, it entailed a complex 
leap forward by all of the five long-term mainstreams mentioned above. 
More potential technologies provided higher specific productivity, i.e. 
the paying load for a muscular effort and for a unit of nature’s destruc-
tion. This implied higher variety of social structure, higher informa-
tion volume of social and individual intelligence, and more advanced 
cultural regulation. As a result, humanity’s ecological niche broadened 
and deepened, and population grew. Over time, the evolutionary suc-
cess entai  led increasing social needs and ambitions, and... the way to the 
next crisis.
This model keeps us oriented within the palliative space of the fu-
ture, and helps us discriminate between constructive forecasts, scripts 
and projects, and utopian ones. At the same time, it involves definite 
conclusions about the past.
In the 19th century, the Russian sociologist N. Danilevsky (1991) 
argued that there had been no significant landmarks for all of human 
history, and therefore, no world history at all. In fact, he meant, separate 
civilizations’ ascent, flourishing and decay had taken place, successive 
in time but devoid of causal continuity. This ‘civilization approach’ was 
later caught up by many Western thinkers, for its pessimistic portrayal 
conformed to the 20th century mass disappointments. Within the para-
digm, Spengler’s (1980) notion that “humankind is merely a zoological 
concept” sounded reasonable.
Meanwhile, it was just in the 20th century that the historical discov-
eries disavowed the argument, and its far-reaching conclusions. As far 
as we take those discoveries into account, we may accept at least certain 
statements assertively.
To make sure of the substantially global character of human his-
tory, as well as life history, the congruent ‘unit’ of consideration is to be 
singled out.
Thus, biological evolution is out of sight, concentrated on popula-
tions, species, or separate ecosystems: more than 99% of the species on 
Earth had become extinct before the first humans appeared. So noth-
ing but life cycles is obvious until we look at the Geochronological 
Table, which represents the biosphere as a whole at successive geologi-
cal epochs. Similarly, humankind, or more precisely, the global soci-
ety-nature system, is the only real subject of social evolution, while 
countries, nations, regional civilizations, and even hominid species 
(in the Paleolithic) repeatedly changed one another as the leaders; by 
themselves, all those smaller subjects cannot serve for an evolutionary 
portrayal.
Since hominids have once and for all turned to tool making, in spite 
of countless divergences, migrations and isolations, culture has been a 
single and common planetary phenomenon. This is proved by many 
observations and one of the main such observation is the surprising fact 
that the first standard tools on all inhabited continents (the handaxe) 
were surprisingly identical. As to the explosive growth of local diversi-
ties in the Middle and the Upper Paleolithic and later, it was a typical 
process of an evolving system’s inner diversification.
What we may call ‘progress’ is neither an aim nor a movement ‘from 
the worse to the better’, but a means of self-preservation, with which the 
complex non-equilibrium system responds to the challenges of declin-
ing sustainability. A succession of a posteriori effects of restored sus-
tainability is retrospectively construed as a step-by-step ascent from 
more ‘natural’ (i.e. wild, and relatively equilibrium) states of the so-
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vital problems, progressive transformations produce more complicated 
ones, and at the same time, more developed means for their solution. 
After all, humans are still living on thanks to their virtue to adapt their 
self-regulation quality to their own increasing might...
Acknowledgements.  Substantial  assistance  in  gathering  empirical 
data,  calculations  and  conceptual  analysis  was  rendered  by  my  col-
leagues, psychologists and historians: Edward Kulpin, Andrei Korotaev, 
Sergei Enikolopov, Vladimir Litvinenko, and Andrei Burovsky.
References
Anikovich, M.V. (1999). Vostochno-evropeyskie ohotniki na mamontov kak os-
obyj kul’turno-istoricheskiy fenomen. [The East-European mammoth hunters as a 
specific historical and cultural phenomenon]. SETI: proshloe, nastoyaschee i buduschee 
tsivilizatsiy. Tezisy konferentsii. Moskva: ATs FIAN. P. 6-9.
Arutiunian, A. (2000). Zapadnaya Evropa: ot rannego hristianstva do Renessansa 
[Western Europe: from early Christianity to Renaissance]. Yerevan: Nairi.
Berzin, E.O. (1984). Vsled za zheleznoy revolyutsiey [Following the Iron Revolu-
tion]. Znanie – Sila, 8. P. 33-35.
Blainey, G.N. (1976). Triumph of the nomads. A history of ancient Australia. Mel-
bourne – Sidney: Macmillan.
Bondarev, L. (1996). Srednevekovyj ekologicheskiy krizis v Zapadnoy i Tsentral’noy 
Evrope i ego preodolenie [The mediaeval ecological crisis in Western and Central Eu-
rope,  and  its  consequences].  Mezhdunarodnaya  konferentsiya  “Ekologicheskiy  opyt 
chelovechestva: proshloe v nastoyaschem i buduschem”. Tezisy dokladov [International 
conference “Humanity’s ecological experience: past, present, and future”. Synopsis of the 
reports]. Moskva: MAI. P. 96-98.
Bromley, Yu.V., et al. (eds.) (1983). Istoriya pervobytnogo obschestva. Obschie vo-
prosy. Problemy antroposotsiogeneza [History of primitive society. General questions. 
The problems of anthropogenesis]. Moskva: Nauka.
Budyko, M.I. (1984). Evolyutsiya biosfery [Evolution of the biosphere]. Moskva: 
Gidrometeoizdat.
Burovsky, A.M. (1998). Idillicheskiy paleolit? [The Paleolithic idyllic?]. Social Sci-
ences Today, 1. P. 163-174.
Carneiro, R.L. (1970). A theory of the origin of the state. Science, 169, 3947.   
P. 733-738.
Chick, G. (1997). Cultural complexity: The concept and its measurement. Cross-
Cultural Research. The Journal of Comparative Social Science, 31, 4. P. 275-307.
Chick,  G.  (1998).  Games  in  culture  revisited.  Cross-Cultural  Research,  32,  2.   
P. 185-206.
Childe, V.H. (1945). Progress and archeology. London: Watts, Thinker’s Library.
Cohen, M.N. (1989). Health and the rise of civilization. New Haven: Yale Univ. 
Press.
Danilevsky, N.Ya. (1991). Rossija i Evropa [Russia and Europe]. Moskva: Kniga.
Davis, J. (1969). Toward a theory of revolution. Studies in Social Movements. A 
Social-Psychological Perspective. N-Y: Free Press. P. 85-108.
Davydenkov, S.N. (1947). Evolyutsionno-geneticheskie problemy v nevropatologii 
[The problems of evolution and genetics in neuropathology]. Leningrad: Volodarskij 
Edit.
Diamond, J. (1999). Guns, germs, and steel. The fates of human societies. London: 
W.W. Norton & Company.
Global Environmental Outlook-3 (2002). Vol. 3, Aug.
Grigoriev, A.A. (1991). Ekologicheskie uroki proshlogo i sovremennosti [The eco-
logical lessons of the past and the present]. Leningrad: Nauka.
Grimak, L.P. (2001). Vera kak sostavlyayusshaya gipnoza [Faith as a component of 
hypnotism]. Prikladnaya psihologiya, 6. P. 89-96.
Hobsbawm, E. (1994). The age of extremes: The short twentieth century, 1914-1991. 
London: Michael Joseph.
Jaspers, K. (1955). Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte. Frankfurt/Main; Ham-
burg: Fischer Bucherei.
Karlen, A. (2001). Plague’s progress. A social history of man and desease. N.Y.: 
Phoenix.
Klix, F. (1983). Erwachendes Denken. Eine Entwicklungsgeschichte der menschli-
chen Intelligenz. Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften.
Kohlberg, L. (1984). The psychology of moral development. N-Y: Harper & Row.
Korotaev, A.V. (1991). Nekotorye ekonomicheskie predposylki klassoobrazovani-
ya i politogeneza [On the economic premises for class formation and politogenesis]. 
Arhaicheskoe obschestvo: uzlovye problemy sotsiologii razvitiya. Sbornik nauchnyh tru-
dov. Moskva: II AN SSSR. P.136-191.
Korotaev, A. (2008). Book review. The Journal of Philosophical Economics, 2, 1. 
P. 147-152.
Le Goff, J. (1977). La civilisation de l’occident medieval. Paris: Arthaud.
Lin Yufu, J. (1995). The Needham puzzle: why the industrial revolution did not 
originate in China? Economic Development and Cultural Change, 43, 2. P. 269-292.
Lobok, A.N. (1997). Antropologiya mifa [Anthropology of myth]. Ekaterinburg: BKI.98 Akop P. Nazaretyan On the mechanisms of moral development in evolutionary historical Psychology 99
Lorenz,  K.  (1981).  Das  sogenannte  Bose  (Zur  naturgechichte  der  agression). 
Munchen: Dt. Taschenbuch Verlach.
McEvedy, C. & Jones, R. (1978). Atlas of world population history. London: Allen 
Line.
McNeill, W.H. (1992). Control and catastrophe in human affairs. The global con-
dition: Conquerors, catastrophes and community. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. 
P. 133-149.
Mel’yancev, V. (1996). Vostok i Zapad vo vtorom tysyacheletii: ekonomika, istoriya i 
sovremennost’ [East and West in the 2nd Millennium: economy, history, and modernity]. 
Moskva: Izdat-vo Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo Universiteta.
Mel’yancev, V. (2004). Kak eto proizoshlo [How this happened]. Vestnik  Mosk-
ovskogo universiteta,13. P. 3-43.
Mironenko, N.S. (2002). Izmenenie otnosheniy «politika – prostranstvo». [Chang-
ing relations ‘policy – space’]. Global’nye problemy: geograficheskaya panorama 2002 
Materialy postoyanno deystvuyuschego mezhdistsiplinarnogo seminara Kluba uchenyh 
«Global’nyj mir», vipusk 8, 20. Moskva: IMEMO. P. 26-31.
Munroe, R.L., Hulefeld, R., Rogers, J.M., et al. (2000). Aggression among children 
in four cultures. Cross-Cultural Research, 34, 1. P. 3-25.
Nazaretyan, A.P. (2003). Agressivnaya tolpa, massovaya panika, sluhi. Lektsii po 
sotsial’noy i politicheskoy psihologii [Aggressive crowds, mass panic, and rumors. Lec-
tures in social and political psychology]. Sankt- Peterburg: Piter.
Nazaretyan, A.P. (2004). Tsivilizatsionnye krizisy v kontekste Universal’noy istorii. 
Sinergetika, psihologiya i prognozirovanie [Civilization crises within the context of Uni-
versal history. Self-organization, psychology, and forecasts]. Moskva: Mir.
Nazaretyan, A.P. (2005). Fear of the dead as a factor in social self-organization. 
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 35, 2. P. 155-169.
Nazaretyan, A.P. (2008). Antropologiya nasiliya i kul’tura samoorganizatsii: Ocher-
ki po evolyutsionno-istoricheskoy psihologii [Anthropology of violence and culture of self-
organization. Essays on evolutionary historical psychology]. Moskva: LKI.
Neronova, V.D., et al. (eds.) (1989). Istoriya drevnego mira. Upadok drevnih ob-
schestv [History of the Ancient World. Decay of Ancient societies]. Moskva: Nauka.
Pegov, S.A. & Puzachenko, Yu.G. (1994). Obschestvo i priroda na poroge XXI 
veka [Society and nature on the threshold of the 21st century]. Obschestvennye nauki i 
sovremennost’, 5. P. 146-152.
Petrenko, V.F. (1982). Eksperimental’naya psihosemantika: issledovanie indivi-
dual’nogo soznaniya [Experimental psycho-semantics: the research of individual con-
sciousness]. Problemy psikhologii, 5. P. 23-35.
Petrenko, V.F. (2005). Osnovy psikhosemantiki [The foundations of psycho-seman-
tics]. Sankt-Peterburg: Piter.
Pfeiffer, J.E. (1985). The creative explosion. An inquiry into the origins of art and 
religion. N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press.
Piaget, J. (1997). The moral development of the child. N.Y.: Free Press.
Pirozhkova, L. (1997). Chelovek i voyna. «Kruglyj stol» uchenyh [Man and warfare. 
A “Round Table” of scientists]. Obschestvennye nauki i sovremennost’, 4. P. 152-167.
Pomerants, G.S. (1991). Opyt filosofii solidarnosti [An assay on philosophy of 
solidarity]. Voprosy Filosofii, 3. P. 57-66.
Reymers, N.F. Prirodopol’zovanie: slovar’-spravochnik [The usage of nature: a refer-
ence book]. Moskva: Mysl.
Semionov, S.A. (1964). Ocherk razvitiya material’noy kul’tury i hozyaystva paleol-
ita [Essay on development of the Paleolithic material culture and economy]. U istokov 
chelovechestva. (Osnovnye problemy antropogeneza). Moskva: Izdat-vo Moskovskogo 
gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. P. 152-190.
Semionov, S.I. (2009). Idei gumanizma v iberoamerikanskih kul’turah [The ideas 
of humanism in the Ibero-American culture]. Obschestvennye nauki i sovremen-
nost’, 1. P. 163-173.
Smil, V. (1994). Energy in world history. Boulder; Colorado: Westview Press.
Snooks, G.D. (1996). The dynamic society. Exploring the sources of global change. 
London; N-Y: Routledge.
Social’noe nasilie: evolyutsionno-istoricheskiy aspekt [Social violence: the evo-
lutionary aspect] (2005). “Kruglyj stol” uchenyh. Obschestvennye nauki i sovremen-
nost’, 4. P. 138-147.
Spengler, O. (1980). Der untergang der Abenlandes: umrisse der morphologie der 
Weltgeschichte. Munchen: Dt. Taschenbuch Verl.
Sykes, B. (2001). The seven daughters of Eve. N.Y.; London: Norton & Co.
Teilhard de Chardin, P. (1965). Les phenomene humain. Paris: Seul.
Urlanis, B.Ts. (1994). Istoriya voennyh poter’: Voyny i narodonaselenie Evropy 
[History of the warfare losses]. Sankt-Peterburg.: Polygon.
Vartanian, S.R., Arslanov, Kh.A., et al. (1995). Radiocarbon dating evidence for 
mammoths  on  Wrangell  Island,  Arctic  Ocean,  until  2000  BC.  Radiocarbon,  37,  1, 
P. 1-6.
Vigasin, A.A. (1994). Mudretsy Drevnego Kitaya [The Ancient China’s wise men]. 
V kn. Drevniy mir glazami sovremennikov i istorikov. Chast’ I. Drevniy Vostok. Moskva: 
Interprax. P. 183-207.
Volovikova, M.I., & Rebeko, T.A. (1990). Sootnoshenie kognitivnogo i moral’-
no  go razvitiya [The correlation of cognitive and moral development]. Psihologiya 
lich  nosti v sotsialisticheskom obschestve. Lichnost’ i ee zhiznennyj put’. Moskva: Nau-
ka. P. 81-87.100 Akop P. Nazaretyan
White, G.F. (ed.) (1974). Natural hazards: local, national, global. New York; Lon-
don; Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press.
Wilson, E.O. (1978). On human nature. London: Harvard Univ. Press.
Wright, Q. (1944). Study of War. Vol. I. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
Yarkho, V.N. (1972). Byla li u drevnih grekov sovest’? (K izobrazheniyu cheloveka 
v antichnoy tragedii) [Did the Ancient Greeks have conscience? (Towards the represen-
tation of humans in Antic tragedy)]. Antichnost’ i sovremennost’. Moskva: Nauka. 
P. 251-263.
Yefremov, K. (2004). Puteshestvie po krizisam [A travel around the crises]. Licej  skoe 
i gimnazicheskoe obrazovanie [Education in Lyceum and Gymnasium], 3. P.  4-5, 68-70.